Netflix and Quill: Using Access and Consumption to Create a Plan for Taxing the Cloud by Fletcher, William L., Jr.
William & Mary Law Review
Volume 58 | Issue 3 Article 6
Netflix and Quill: Using Access and Consumption
to Create a Plan for Taxing the Cloud
William L. Fletcher Jr.
Copyright c 2017 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr
Repository Citation
William L. Fletcher Jr., Netflix and Quill: Using Access and Consumption to Create a Plan for Taxing the
Cloud, 58 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1029 (2017), http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr/vol58/iss3/6
NOTES
NETFLIX AND QUILL: USING ACCESS AND CONSUMPTION
TO CREATE A PLAN FOR TAXING THE CLOUD
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1030
I. THE CHICAGO CLOUD TAX: WHY IT EXISTS, THE POLICY 
BEHIND IT, AND WHERE IT FAILS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1034
A. Why Tax the Cloud? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1034
B. Chicago’s Cloud Tax Ruling and Municipal Code . . . . . 1037
C. State and Local Tax Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1040
II. QUILL’S NEXUS AND THE ILLINOIS FRAMEWORK OF
AMUSEMENT TAX ANALYSIS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1045
A. Quill and the Nexus Dilemma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1045
B. Amusement Tax Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1047
1. Membership Fees Involving Amusement and 
Nonamusement Components . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1048
2. The Risk of the Occupational Tax. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1049
3. Uniformity and the Cloud Tax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1050
4. The Internet Tax Freedom Act and Discrimination. . . 1051
III. A NEW PROPOSAL AND A RESPONSE TO OTHERS PAST, 
PRESENT, AND FUTURE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1056
A. A Privilege-Based Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1056
1. Per-Transaction Privilege . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1056
2. Subscription Privilege . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1057
3. Hybrid Privilege. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1058
4. Nexus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1059
B. Other Proposals, Analogues, and Nontax Alternatives. . 1059
CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1065
1029
1030 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:1029
INTRODUCTION
On June 9, 2015, the Chicago Department of Finance created an
uproar when its Comptroller, Dan Widawsky, issued two rulings
extending the reach of Chicago’s amusement tax to include online
streaming media, calling into question whether and how a tax can
apply to film, television, and music in an age of streaming entertain-
ment.1 But, the idea of an amusement tax is nothing new, dating
back to at least the 1800s.2 Although taxing Internet streaming
services may seem unprecedented, the amusement tax as a potential
1. See Dan Widawsky, Comptroller, Dep’t of Fin., City of Chi., Amusement Tax Ruling
#5 (June 9, 2015) [hereinafter Widawsky, Amusement Tax Ruling], https://www.cityofchicago.
org/content/dam/city/depts/rev/supp_info/TaxRulingsandRegulations/Amusement
TaxRuling_5_06_09_2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZJ4R-SRKW]; Dan Widawsky, Comptroller,
Dep’t of Fin., City of Chi., Personal Property Lease Transaction Tax Ruling #12 (June 9, 2015)
[hereinafter Widawsky, Personal Property Lease Transaction Tax Ruling], https://www.city
ofchicago.org /content /dam /city /depts /rev /supp_info /TaxRulingsandRegulations/Lease
TaxRuling12-06092015.pdf [https://perma.cc/3PPQ-BV3U]. For an overview of the tax rulings
and some of the problems they pose, see Tax Practice Group McDermott Will & Emery,
Taxing the Means or the Ends? Chicago Cloud Computing Rulings’ Confused Approaches Can
Support Taxpayer Challenges, NAT’L L. REV. (Aug. 17, 2015), http://www.natlawreview.com/
article/taxing-means-or-ends-chicago-cloud-computing-rulings-confused-approaches-can-
support [https://perma.cc/5A33-C9UF]; see also Melissa Harris, The Mess Chicago’s ‘Cloud
Tax’ Only Makes Messier, CHI. TRIB. (July 26, 2015), http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/
columnists/ct-harris-cloud-tax-proposal-0726-biz-20150724-column.html [https://perma.cc/
Z4PD-ZXMT] (arguing that tax policy should be created at the state level). It should be noted
that since the writing of this Note, Chicago is not the only taxing jurisdiction expanding its
reach to streaming media, and some are doing so at the state level. Pennsylvania’s Act 84 of
2016 introduced a 6 percent sales and use tax on electronically transferred digital products.
Act of Jul. 13, 2016, P.L. 526, No. 84, http://www.legis.state.pa.us/cfdocs/legis/li/uconsCheck.
cfm?yr=2016&sessInd=0&act=84 [https://perma.cc/A6VP-PE53]; see also Digital Products, PA.
DEP’T REVENUE, http://www.revenue.pa.gov/GeneralTaxInformation/Tax%20Types%20and
%20Information/Pages/Sales%20Use%20and%20Hotel%20Occupancy%20Tax/Digital-
Products.aspx# [https://perma.cc/AQF8-YMYJ]. At the local level, in California, Pasadena city
officials are considering a tax on Internet media through a utility tax intended for utilities like
water, electricity, and traditional cable television. See James F. Peltz, Pasadena and Other
California Cities Weigh a ‘Netflix Tax’ for Video Subscribers, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 3, 2016, 3:00
AM), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-agenda-netflix-tax-20161003-snap-story.html
[https://perma.cc/3J2G-75TZ].
2. See, e.g., George Curtis, COMM. ON THE D.C. LICENSE TAX ON MERRY-GO-ROUNDS, ETC.,
H.R. REP. NO. 55-1291, at 1 (1898). Nor is the amusement tax debate new to Chicago: before
the “Cloud Tax” was the “Yuppie Tax,” which attempted to extend Chicago’s amusement tax
to health club membership fees. Paul Reidinger, The Price of Amusement: “Yuppie Tax”
Upheld, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1, 1987, at 120, 120 (1987) (setting the stage in Chicago for a court’s
take on the amusement tax).
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vehicle to do so is not.3 Immediate and widespread opposition,
however, suggests that the world is not ready. From a suit challeng-
ing the ruling to remarks made by the Federal Communications
Commission, to proposed federal legislation, and even to delays in
implementing the tax due to complaints from local businesses,
Chicago’s tax ruling is already subject to bad blood.4
Even though it is understandable that both businesses and
consumers—those ultimately responsible for bearing the cost of the
tax—would be hesitant to accept a tax on streaming entertainment,
such a tax may be inevitable.5 With the changing media landscape
3. An amusement tax is defined as “[a] tax on a ticket to a concert, sporting event, or the
like,” which is often “expressed as a percentage of the ticket price.” Amusement Tax, BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). The amusement tax may offer a means to skirt the confines
of a sales and use tax, as well as a precedent limiting the enforcement of a sales and use tax.
For example, some argue that the physical presence requirement set forth in Quill Corp. v.
North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 317-18 (1992), discussed in greater detail infra Part II.A, may
only apply to a sales and use tax, and not to other taxes such as income or franchise tax. See
John A. Swain, State Income Tax Jurisdiction: A Jurisprudential and Policy Perspective, 45
WM. & MARY L. REV. 319, 323 (2003) (“Indeed, dictum in Quill suggests that the nexus
standard for taxes other than sales and use taxes may not be physical presence.”). See infra
Part I and Part III.B for a discussion on various state attempts to implement sales and use
taxes on e-commerce. 
4. See Digital Goods and Services Tax Fairness Act of 2015, S. 851, 114th Cong. (2015);
Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 1, Labell v. City of Chicago, No. 2015-CH-
13399 (Ill. Cir. Ct. filed June 9, 2015) [hereinafter Labell Complaint]; Ajit Pai, Comm’r, Fed.
Commc’ns Comm’n, Remarks of FCC Commissioner Ajit Pai Before the Churchill Club Palo
Alto, CA (July 17, 2015) (“[I]n California, by contrast, digital streaming services are not
taxed.... [T]hat’s the right approach. Government should welcome the growth of online video,
not discourage it.... [I]t is a basic principle of economics that the more you tax something, the
less of it you get.”); Personal Property Lease Transaction Tax Ruling 12, Note, CITY OF CHI.
(June 30, 2015), http://www.cityofchicago.org/city/en/depts/fin/provdrs/tax_division/news/2015/
june/PersonalPropertyLeaseTransactionTax12Effective7-1-2015.html [https://perma.cc/4LC6-
FGGM] (extending the effective date of the ruling from September 2015 to January 2016 to
allow businesses additional time to make necessary changes to implement the tax).
5. See Rebecca Millar, The “Netflix Tax”—Coming to a Country Near You, CONVERSATION
(Apr. 21, 2015, 4:11 PM), https://theconversation.com/the-netflix-tax-coming-to-a-country-
near-you-40475 [https://perma.cc/X8XQ-STAH] (discussing a streaming consumption tax in
Australia and elsewhere: “A Netflix tax—as the media has dubbed it—is not a radical new
idea but an inevitable and necessary development. It is qualitatively different from the base-
broadening involved in removing GST exemptions for food, education, health, and other social
goods and is more appropriately described as base-restoration.”); Pras Subramanian, Why
You’ll be Paying a ‘Netflix Tax’ Soon, YAHOO! FIN. (Aug. 21, 2015), http://finance.yahoo.com/
news/why-you-ll-be-paying-a--netflix-tax--soon-161951515.html [https://perma.cc/6V79-VM6R]
(discussing Chicago and other state efforts to implement taxes on cloud computing and
internet streaming services, arguing taxes are not improper and, rather, should be expected);
The Canadian Press, ‘Netflix Tax’ Inevitable, Say Experts, HUFFINFGTON POST BUS.: CAN.
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and transition to Internet consumption, state and local jurisdictions,
without a means to tax many remote vendors, lose out on millions
of dollars.6 Implementing a tax on online media allows taxing
jurisdictions to recoup some of the losses the cord-cutting trend of
transitioning from cable to online entertainment imposes on them;7
Chicago alone expects revenues of up to $12 million.8 Despite
opposition, this Note operates on the presumption that such a tax
is foreseeable given changes in consumption habits and foreign
trends to tax the same.9 Furthermore, the purpose of this Note is
not to debate moral wrongs; nor will this Note delve into concerns
about copyright, privacy, constitutional issues, or data security,
which have so often been regarded as the focal point of cloud
concerns in academia. Rather, the purpose of this Note is to consider
how such a tax on online media might mechanically function. The
goal is not to evaluate Chicago’s Cloud Tax for Chicago’s sake so
much as it is to model what a cloud tax should resemble in a given
jurisdiction.
(Aug. 6, 2015, 5:38 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.ca/2015/08/06/tax-on-services-like-netflix-
inevitable-as-more-services-go-online-experts-say_n_7951644.html [https://perma.cc/NS53-
HN5H] (discussing the “loophole” created by tax-free online purchases and the likelihood
future governments will exploit it as a new source of revenue).
6. See Sofia Morales, The Amazon Tax: Collecting the Use Tax in the Aftermath of the
New York Appellate Court’s Recent Holding, 13 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 56, 70 (2013) (esti-
mating state losses as high as $7.7 billion for purchases from out-of-state vendors).
7. The changing media landscape and mass transition to general Internet consumption
has left state and local jurisdictions without a means to tax many remote vendors. Such an
inability to collect taxes has resulted, or at least will result, in the loss of millions of dollars
in essential revenue. The Oxford Dictionary defines a “cord cutter” as “[a] person who cancels
or forgoes a cable television subscription or landline phone connection in favor of an alterna-
tive Internet-based or wireless service.” Cord cutter, OXFORD DICTIONARIES, http://www.
oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/cord-cutter [https://perma.cc/293V-
GAXQ]. And, with changing generations, it is not just cord cutters one need worry about, but
also “the far more common ‘cord-nevers’ who had never signed up in the first place.” Keach
Hagey, Cord-Cutting Is Accelerating: By 2018, 21% of U.S. Households Won’t Pay for Tradi-
tional TV, eMarketer Says, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 10, 2015, 6:00 AM), http://www.wsj.com/ articles/
cord-cutting-is-accelerating-1449745201 [https://perma.cc/C4ZH-RNHB]; see also Cynthia Lit-
tleton, Cord Cutting Survey: 19% of Young Adults Have Dropped Cable or Satellite TV Service,
VARIETY (Dec. 22, 2015, 12:30 PM), http://variety.com/2015/biz/news/cord-cutting-19-young-
adults-24-pew-research-center-1201666723/ [https://perma.cc/V9R5-SKHX].
8. Cheryl Corley, Chicago’s ‘Cloud Tax’ Raises the Cost of Streaming Videos, NPR (July
10, 2015, 5:06 AM), http://www.npr.org/2015/07/10/421483715/chicagos-cloud-tax-raises-the-
cost-of-streaming-videos [https://perma.cc/K6PX-WAWW].
9. See infra Part III.B.
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Part I introduces Chicago’s tax rulings, contextualizing them
within the city’s tax initiatives, as well as state and local tax poli-
cy.10 Additionally, Part I discusses why a jurisdiction would seek to
impose a tax on cloud media, as well as points out some of the
failures of Chicago’s plan. Part II picks up from these failures and
analyzes how they fall in line with current case precedent. Specifi-
cally, Part II considers some of the inherent problems with taxing
remote vendors—especially online remote vendors—under the
Supreme Court’s precedent established in Quill Corp. v. North
Dakota.11 Part II then uses the Illinois-specific case law as applied
to Chicago’s amusement tax to formulate a framework through
which to understand and evaluate an amusement tax as applied to
Internet media. From the framework established in Parts I and II,
Part III then offers a proposal on how a cloud tax might work. The
proposal pays particular attention to the most common problems
with past attempts, as well as those problems that are most
overlooked and Internet-specific. The proposal aims to—as simply
10. It should be noted that throughout this Note much of the analysis relies on state and
local tax policy, as well as academia on sales and use tax, as opposed to strict analysis of
amusement tax policy, which would be near impossible. For example, a Westlaw search for
“amusement tax” within Law Reviews and Journals proffers fewer than one hundred results,
and only a fraction of that number in the last three years. Search Results of “amusement tax”
in Law Reviews & Journals, WESTLAW, http://next.westlaw.com (search “amusement tax” in
global search bar; then view “Secondary Sources;” then view Publication Type “Law Reviews
& Journals”). Of those results, many touch on only sports—or sport stadiums to be more
precise—and limit discussion of amusement tax policy, if any, to only a few lines. Id. As
discussed later, the idea of an amusement tax approach for online media offers specific
advantages over a strict sales tax, see infra Part III, but borrowing from state sales and use
tax policy offers a structured, albeit theoretical, framework for understanding taxing the
cloud.
For context it is important to understand the difference of the sales and use tax as opposed
to the amusement tax defined above. See Amusement Tax, supra note 3. A “[s]ales tax is a tax
on the gross receipts from the sale or lease of tangible personal property as well as certain
services.” DAVID E. HARDESTY, ELECTRONIC COMMERCE: TAXATION & PLANNING ¶ 14.02 (2016).
A use tax, however, operates to collect on receipts for purchases not covered by a sales tax,
and it is a tax on use of the exempt property within a taxing jurisdiction. See id. In function,
the use tax operates much the same way as a sales tax. See id. Use taxes are a means to
collect on sales outside of a taxing jurisdiction that will be used in that jurisdiction; policy
would suggest that “[u]se taxes are designed to discourage the purchase of products that are
not subject to the sales tax.” Use Tax, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). For that
reason, this Note will address the sales and use taxes as nondistinct components.
11. 504 U.S. 298, 317-18 (1992) (holding in favor of a bright-line, physical presence test
to establish a nexus for a state sales tax against an out-of-state vendor, at least until
Congress, free to make its own decisions, legislates otherwise).
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and wholly as possible—distinguish between different types of
Internet media and develop a plan that discerns the license-based
subscription services from the transactional purchases in a tax plan
that is sound, functional, and uniform. Part III then contrasts this
proposal with other past and future approaches to tax streaming
media. Again, this Note, for purposes of this discussion, assumes a
tax is inevitable, and instead of asking why, should, or when, it
seeks the more pressing question of how. After all, in the end this
is a question best left for Congress.
I. THE CHICAGO CLOUD TAX: WHY IT EXISTS, THE POLICY BEHIND
IT, AND WHERE IT FAILS
A. Why Tax the Cloud?
Why Chicago or any municipality would want to tax streaming
data is understandable. In 1998, the state income tax replaced the
sales and use tax as the most important tax revenue for states,
proving that sales taxes are losing weight in a changing economy.12
Further, the fear that e-commerce adds to this “already eroding tax
base” exacerbates the perceived necessity of taxing online media.13
E-commerce places burdens on states and, in particular, small, local
jurisdictions by limiting their tax reach: unlike in-state brick and
mortar establishments, nexus requirements prevent jurisdictions
12. See DAVID BRUNORI, STATE TAX POLICY: A POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE 7-8 (2d ed. 2005).
For an exacting breakdown of state tax collections by state, the Census Bureau’s classification
of tax types, and the percentages of each within each state, see CHERYL LEE ET AL., U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, G14-STC, STATE GOVERNMENT TAX COLLECTIONS SUMMARY REPORT: 2014
(2015), http://www2.census.gov/govs/statetax/G14-STC-Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/MB3S-
AFPV]; see also Tracy A. Kaye, Show Me the Money: Congressional Limitations on State Tax
Sovereignty, 35 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 149, 184-85 (1998) (warning that, despite the state sales
tax being the leading source of state tax revenue in 1995, a shift to a service-oriented economy
will limit sales tax revenue); Kirk J. Stark, The Federal Role in State Tax Reform, 30 VA. TAX
REV. 407, 420 (2010) (detailing varying compositions of state tax bases across income, sales,
and property taxes).
13. BRUNORI, supra note 12, at 61 (footnote omitted). E-commerce refers to “[t]he practice
of buying and selling goods and services through online consumer services and of conducting
other business activities using an electronic device and the Internet.” E-Commerce, BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
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from collecting taxes from many e-commerce vendors.14 Estimates
suggest these losses cost the states as much as $7.7 billion.15 In an
effort to understand the effect on a single state, consider that North
Carolina alone claims losses of up to $145 million.16 Some worry
that without a means to ensure tax revenue, “local governments
could be weakened to the point of irrelevance.”17
Even though the numbers detailed above consider e-commerce as
a whole, it is important to couple them with an understanding of
online media consumption in context. During the past decade, con-
sumption markets have changed. The traditional market for owner-
ship has shifted to a market for temporary access, conceptualized as
“access-based consumption.”18 Television has been fending off
threats since the introduction of home VCRs in the 1970s, followed
by more modern advancements like DVR, TiVo, and on-demand
viewing.19 This trend not only shifted viewers from prime-time
viewing, but also provided a means to fast-forward through paid
advertising, or skip it altogether, creating a rift in how program-
ming earned its profits.20 The Internet, however, has made the
14. See Morales, supra note 6, at 70. “Nexus” is defined simply as an often-causal
connection or link. Nexus, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). In the context of e-
commerce, nexus refers to the minimum requirements of connection that a taxing jurisdiction
must have to tax an out-of-state vendor. See HARDESTY, supra note 10, ¶ 14.03. See also infra
Part II for a discussion of the nexus standard.
15. Morales, supra note 6, at 70.
16. Id. But any reliance on revenue projections resulting from e-commerce should be
measured with some restraint. See HARDESTY, supra note 10, ¶ 19.02 (“There is little reliable
information as to the amount of sales and use tax revenue raised from online transactions and
the amount of tax revenue lost because of the failure to collect tax on such transactions.”).
17. DAVID BRUNORI, LOCAL TAX POLICY: A FEDERALIST PERSPECTIVE 2 (2d ed. 2007).
18. Fleura Bardhi & Giana M. Eckhardt, Access-Based Consumption: The Case of Car
Sharing, 39 J. CONSUMER RES. 881, 881 (2012) (“We define access-based consumption as
transactions that may be market mediated in which no transfer of ownership takes place. The
consumer is acquiring consumption time with the item, and, in market-mediated cases of
access, is willing to pay a price premium for use of that object. Consumers are able to access
objects or networks that they could not afford to own or that they choose not to own.” (citation
omitted)). Granted, cable television in and of itself is not ownership but access to forms of paid
programming; however, the idea of access-based consumption touches on changing views on
consumption such as timeliness, immediacy, access, and shared community benefits. See id.
at 895-96. Companies like Netflix provide a means for consumers to gain access “through
sharing or pooling of resources” that can better reflect “consumers’ relationship to products
and services and their preferences, values, and desires.” Id. at 881-82.
19. See Lisa Lapan, Comment, Network Television and the Digital Threat, 16 UCLA ENT.
L. REV. 343, 345-46 (2009). 
20. See id.
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greatest impact: it has instant distribution and access, limited—if
any—advertising, zero cost margin, and all at the click of a mouse
or swipe of a finger.21 Cable has not lost viewers solely to cord-
cutting. Digital media gives access to three screens—the television,
the computer, and the mobile device—fragmenting advertising
costs, and decreasing revenue for networks.22 As of 2008, 76 percent
of consumers watched video from a computer, and 32 percent from
a mobile device.23 It would be no stretch to deduce that these
numbers have increased drastically since then.24 More to the point,
in 2012 alone, Internet traffic in the United States increased 36
percent, and that traffic is expected to triple by 2017.25 In the same
year, prime-time traffic grew 41 percent, with Netflix solely
generating one-third of all downstream traffic in the United States
during those hours.26 This suggests not only increased Internet use,
but, specifically, cord-cutting trends and the necessity to look to the
Internet for tax revenue.
Some argue that e-commerce on the whole should be exempt from
tax under theories of “infant industry,” the socioeconomic “digital
divide” of Internet access, the lack of benefit to the burdened remote
vendors charged with collecting the tax, and economic benefits of
encouraging competition among remote vendors.27 But there is
evidence that some online vendors collect taxes across various states
“without major difficulties.”28 For example, Netflix collects sales
taxes for its DVD rentals “in practically every state.”29 Netflix can
do this “easily and cheaply” by using a company specializing in
collecting and complying with tax laws across different jurisdic-
tions.30 Netflix is not alone; per its terms and conditions, Apple’s
21. See id.
22. See id. at 345.
23. Id. at 355.
24. See Hagey, supra note 7 (suggesting 17 percent of U.S. households will not subscribe
to cable by the end of 2015, and 23 percent will not subscribe by the end of 2019).
25. Daniel A. Lyons, Internet Policy’s Next Frontier: Usage-Based Broadband Pricing, 66
FED. COMM. L.J. 1, 3 (2013).
26. See id. at 3 n.2.
27. Charles E. McLure, Jr., Thinking Straight About the Taxation of Electronic Commerce:
Tax Principles, Compliance Problems, and Nexus, 16 TAX POL’Y & ECONOMY 115, 124-25
(2002).
28. Morales, supra note 6, at 71.
29. Id. 
30. Id.
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iTunes Store also collects taxes for various states, and can still turn
a profit on sales as low as sixty-nine cents.31 Thus, rather than
introducing new problems, e-commerce merely shines a light on
problems already in play—namely, nexus and uniformity.32
B. Chicago’s Cloud Tax Ruling and Municipal Code
Before analyzing and proposing an approach to taxing streaming
media in the cloud, it is important to place the Chicago rulings in
context. The Chicago Municipal Code defines an “amusement” as
“(1) any exhibition, performance, presentation or show for entertain-
ment purposes, ... (2) any entertainment or recreational activity
offered for public participation or on a membership or other basis ...
or (3) any paid television programming, whether transmitted by
wire, cable, fiber optics, laser, microwave, radio, satellite or similar
means.”33 The Code calls for a 9 percent tax on fees paid in consider-
ation for “the privilege to enter, to witness, to view or to participate
in such amusement,” to be collected and remitted by every owner,
operator, or reseller of an amusement.34 The Chicago Personal
Property Lease Transaction Tax Ordinance, however, places a 9 per-
cent tax on “(1) the lease or rental in the city of personal property,
or (2) the privilege of using in the city personal property that is
leased or rented outside the city.”35 Despite calling for a tax on any
31. See id. In the past, Apple explicitly stipulated that any applicable tax would be
included in the total price and calculated according to the purchaser’s billing address. Apple’s
iTunes Terms and Conditions, APPLE.COM, https://perma.cc/8LZE-B4B4 (“Your total price will
include the price of the product plus any applicable tax; such tax is based on the bill-to
address and the tax rate in effect at the time you download the product.”). However, as of
September 13, 2016, the terms have changed: the language of the “bill-to address” and “total
price” has been removed, replaced by the curt but malleable “including any applicable tax.”
Apple’s iTunes Terms and Conditions, APPLE.COM, http://www.apple.com/legal/internet-
services/itunes/us/terms.html [https://perma.cc/VG43-X54E] (last updated Sept. 13, 2016)
(“Apple will charge your payment method (such as your credit card, debit card, gift card/code,
or other method available in your Home Country) for any paid Transactions, including any
applicable taxes.”).
32. See McLure, supra note 27, at 117 (“For the most part, the advent of electronic
commerce has highlighted problems that were there all along; it did not create them. Most of
these problems—but not all—stem from the lack of uniformity of the taxes imposed by the
states ... and their numerous political subdivisions.”).
33. CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE § 4-156-010 (2016). 
34. Id. §§ 4-156-010 to -030. For a listing of exemptions, see id. § 4-156-020(B).
35. Id. §§ 3-32-010 to -030. 
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rental or lease on personal property other than real property, the
ordinance explicitly exempts the lease, rental, or use of a motion
picture film.36
Widawsky’s amusement tax ruling interprets the amusement tax
to include not only those amusements witnessed in person, but also
those that are “delivered electronically,” including television shows,
movies, videos, electronically delivered music, and online games.37
The amusement tax, however, revolves around the idea of privilege,
and “does not apply to sales of shows, movies, videos, music, or
games (normally accomplished by a ‘permanent’ download). It
applies only to rentals (normally accomplished by streaming or a
‘temporary’ download).”38 Accordingly, the ruling explains that the
amusement tax applies to “subscription fees, per-event fees or
otherwise.”39 Neither the Code nor the ruling distinguishes between
the types of fees paid.40 The ruling does, however, make an effort to
approach those fees, or “bundled” charges, that include both taxable
and nontaxable elements.41 Relying on a previous Personal Property
Lease Transaction Tax Ruling, Widawsky mandates that if a
bundled charge does not separate the taxable amusement charge
from the nontaxable, then the entire price is presumed taxable if it
is primarily for a privilege to witness an amusement.42 
Finally, as to the question of nexus, although the ruling reinforces
that the tax applies whenever an amusement takes place in Chi-
cago, the vendor itself decides whether it has an obligation to
collect.43 This places a burden on the vendor not only to collect and
36. Id. § 3-32-050.
37. Widawsky, Amusement Tax Ruling, supra note 1, ¶ 8. 
38. Id. ¶ 10.
39. Id.
40. CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE § 4-156-020(A) (2016) (“The rate of the tax shall be equal to nine
percent of the admission fees or other charges paid for the privilege to enter, to witness, to
view or to participate in such amusement.”); Widawsky, Amusement Tax Ruling, supra note
1, ¶ 10 (“The charges paid ... may be subscription fees, per-event fees or otherwise.”).
41. Widawsky, Amusement Tax Ruling, supra note 1, ¶ 12.
42. See id. (quoting Dep’t of Fin., City of Chi., Personal Property Lease Transaction Tax
Ruling #3 (June 1, 2004)). As discussed in Part II infra, the bundled approach has particular
implications for services like Amazon Prime, which offers members certain shipping privileges
coupled with streaming access to select titles in Amazon’s online database. See Prime Member
Exclusives, AMAZON, https://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display.html?nodeId=200444
160 [https://perma.cc/49UE-KQFU].
43. Widawsky, Amusement Tax Ruling, supra note 1, ¶ 14.
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remit a tax if the vendor has such an obligation, but also to
determine both its own nexus to the jurisdiction and whether a
patron is using its service within the city of Chicago.44 For online
amusements, the amusement tax “will apply to customers whose
residential street address or primary business street address is in
Chicago, as reflected by their credit card billing address, zip code or
other reliable information.”45
The Personal Property Lease Transaction Tax Ruling applies to
nonpossessory computer leases that allow a user to use a provider’s
computer “to input, modify, or retrieve data or information,” as in
a legal research database, such as Westlaw; real estate, car, stock,
and job listings; or online word, data, or tax processing.46 The
Personal Property Lease Transaction Tax Ruling, however, exempts
all entertainment materials—copyrighted books, music, recordings,
and feature-length and episodic films.47
Some contend that these rulings are not so much interpretations
and implementations of existing taxes, but that they are new taxes
exceeding the scope and power of the Comptroller’s authority.48
Although outside the scope of this Note, the Comptroller’s authority
is repeatedly and explicitly stated: to adopt, promulgate, and enforce
every tax ordinance contained in the Municipal Code of Chicago.49
Still, this begs the question why. Before developing a framework of
state and local tax policy, one must speculate on whether such a tax
is sensible within local initiatives. Chicago is in the midst of a
technology push, committing to double Chicago’s tech economy by
44. See id. ¶¶ 9, 13-14.
45. Id. ¶ 13 (emphasis added).
46. Widawsky, Personal Property Lease Transaction Tax Ruling, supra note 1, ¶ 6.
47. Id.
48. See, e.g., Labell Complaint, supra note 4, ¶¶ 40-42, 52-54, 56-57, 64-66, 68-69; Harris,
supra note 1 (noting opinions that a streaming tax should be left to state—not local—tax, and
should be implemented through legislation, not a ruling by a comptroller).
49. See, e.g., CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE § 3-4-150(A)(1) (2016) (“[T]he comptroller is empowered
to adopt, promulgate, and enforce rules and regulations pertaining to the administration and
enforcement of the provisions of this chapter and any tax ordinance.”); id. § 2-32-080 (“[T]he
city comptroller shall have the power[ ] ... [t]o administer and enforce all the responsibilities,
powers and duties delegated to him in every tax ordinance presently contained in or to be
included in the Municipal Code of Chicago.”); id. § 4-156-034 (stating that “the comptroller is
authorized to adopt, promulgate and enforce rules and regulations pertaining to the
interpretation, administration and enforcement of” the amusement tax).
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2023 and create 40,000 jobs in the technology sector.50 It might seem
counterintuitive to simultaneously encourage and tax tech compa-
nies, especially startups. But, many of these arguments may be
moot because the city is considering exemptions to tech startups
based on revenue.51 As discussed in Part III, this exemption may be
key to the fairness of a cloud tax, especially to those companies that
may be outside of the jurisdiction.
C. State and Local Tax Policy
It is a “shibboleth among tax lawyers that an old tax is a good
tax,” but a changing economy and e-commerce market have dam-
aged the efficiency with which old tax plans can collect revenue.52
Rather than implementing a tax plan to account for growing e-
50. See Mayor Rahm Emanuel Announces Commitment To Doubling Chicago Tech
Economy In Next Ten Years, CITY OF CHI. (Nov. 5, 2013), http://www.cityofchicago.org/city/en/
depts/doit/provdrs/software_development/news/2013/nov/mayor_rahm_emanuelannounces
commitmenttodoublingchicagotecheconom.html [https://perma.cc/R6PT-N3WW] (detailing
Chicago’s tech sector goals and three major initiatives: the Lollapalooza venture capital
summit, Purdue University’s weekend MBA program, and recruitment from the country’s top
five business schools); see also, e.g., City of Chicago Adopts Cloud Computing Strategy for City-
wide Email and Applications, CITY OF CHI. (Jan. 3, 2013), http://www.cityofchicago.org/city/en/
depts/doit/provdrs/software_development/news/2013/jan/city_of_chicago_adoptscloudcom
putingstrategyforcity-wideemailand.html [https://perma.cc/XL4A-R73U]; Mayor Emanuel
Launches ‘Chicago Digital’ Website to Connect Public to City’s Digital Innovation Projects,
CITY OF CHI. (Jan. 6, 2013), http://www.cityofchicago.org/city/en/depts/doit/provdrs/software_
development/news/2013/jan/mayor_emanuel_launcheschicagodigitalwebsitetoconnectpub
lictocity.html [https://perma.cc/2TE6-W3SN]; Mayor Emanuel Releases City of Chicago’s First
Ever Technology Plan, CITY OF CHI. (Sept. 17, 2013), http://www.cityofchicago.org/city/en/
depts/doit/provdrs/software_development/news/2013/sep/mayor_emanuel_releasescityofchi
cagosfirstevertechnologyplan.html [https://perma.cc/3JQB-GV8X].
51. See Amina Elahi, Chicago May Exempt Startups from ‘Cloud Tax,’ CHI. TRIB. (July 8,
2015, 8:29 AM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/bluesky/originals/ct-chicago-cloud-tax-david-
huges-6si-20150707-story.html [https://perma.cc/A9WJ-RGW6]; see also Corley, supra note
8. For the Personal Property Lease Transaction Tax, Chicago lowered the 9 percent rate to
5.25 percent for certain cloud products and exempted startups that are less than five years
old and that received less than twenty-five million dollars in yearly sales. Information
Bulletin: Nonpossessory Computer Leases, CITY OF CHI. (Nov. 19, 2015), http://www.cityof
chicago.org/city/en/depts/fin/provdrs/tax_division/news/2015/june/NonpossessoryComputer
Leases.html [https://perma.cc/9Z7C-DEB2].
52. BRUNORI, supra note 12, at 2; see also Charles E. McLure, Jr., Taxation of Electronic
Commerce: Economic Objectives, Technological Constraints, and Tax Laws, 52 TAX L. REV.
269, 318 (1997) (“It is more difficult to monitor the transmittal of electronic signals than to
monitor trade in tangible products, especially when the transmission network is becoming so
widely decentralized and location plays such a small role.”).
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commerce and a shift to a service-based economy, political pressures
instead promoted broad exemptions to traditionally taxable
products.53 Currently, with an increasingly mobile and tech-
dependent economy, interjurisdictional competition creates a
dilemma for municipalities: provide high-quality public services to
its denizens via higher tax revenues, or entice businesses to remain
or relocate through targeted tax incentives.54 Furthermore, old tax
plans may not apply because access-based consumption is “ulti-
mately ... unique” and neither in the realm of purchase for owner-
ship nor sharing.55 But it may still be necessary to formulate an
approach through an understanding of sales and use tax, and this
makes sense.56 Even though taxes are generally disliked, public
opinion suggests that many “identify levies on consumption as
among the most acceptable forms of taxation.”57
A “good” tax should not distort behavior.58 Along with meeting the
purposes of the jurisdiction imposing the tax, a good tax should be
both economically neutral and compliance friendly.59 Arguably, the
simplest (theoretically—not in practice) method would be to tax all
53. See BRUNORI, supra note 12, at 7-8.
54. See id. at 35. For a discussion of both vertical tax competition—between state and
local governments taxing the same or overlapping tax base—and horizontal tax competi-
tion—between local governments—see Erin Adele Scharff, Powerful Cities?: Limits on
Municipal Taxing Authority and What to Do About Them, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 292, 321-26
(2016). However, some argue these local tax incentives encourage relocation in-state only to
a certain extent, and the incentives “often only encourage intrastate business relocation.” Id.
at 324-25. “Further, some studies suggest that many businesses would make the same
location decisions even absent local tax incentives, turning these programs into windfalls for
these businesses to the detriment of local revenue and other taxpayers.” Id. at 325.
55. Bardhi & Eckhardt, supra note 18, at 882; Vlad Frants, The Evolution of Cloud
Computing Taxation: Characterizing and Sourcing Cloud Computing Payments in an Uncer-
tain World, A.B.A., http://www.americanbar.org/groups/young_lawyers/publications/the_101_
201_practice_series/the_evolution_of_cloud_computing_taxation.html [https://perma.cc/6W5P-
7DT7].
56. For an understanding of the distinguishing factors of a sales tax versus a use tax, see
McLure, supra note 27, at 117 n.3 (“Strictly speaking, remote vendors that have a nexus in
a state are required to collect the use tax, which is legally imposed on in-state purchaser’s use
of the purchased item, rather than the sales tax, which is imposed on in-state sales and cannot
be collected on sales originating outside the state.”).
57. BRUNORI, supra note 12, at 54-55.
58. Steven Maguire, Internet Transactions and the Sales Tax, in INTERNET TAXATION 1,
5 (Albert Tokin ed., 2003).
59. See McLure, supra note 27, at 118.
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consumption, taxing sales by local and remote vendors equally.60
Even though this would be functionally neutral and uniform, the
results would not be.61 Sales taxes in themselves are inherently
regressive, disproportionally affecting the poor and having lesser
impact on the wealthy.62 Ideally, a good tax would balance these
concerns. But a tax system has another primary purpose: raising
revenue.63
The revenue must satisfy the needs of public programs and
policies initiated for its citizens.64 Here, Chicago expects $12 million
in additional revenue from the rulings on its property lease and
amusement tax ordinances.65 Whether the $12 million is adequate
for Chicago’s needs remains to be seen, but it is not a trivial figure
and allows some recapture from the shift away from taxable cable
viewing.66
A neutral tax should minimize effects on a consumer’s decision-
making, which is generally realized through a broad tax base and
low rates.67 The cloud tax does not call for a higher tax than
historically nonelectronic media,68 and part of its problem may be
that its tax base is too broad. Furthermore, in the grand scheme, a
9 percent tax on a low monthly Netflix subscription might not seem
so crippling, especially if cable plans would carry the same tax
percentage on a higher cable bill.69
Fairness should exhibit both horizontal equity—those alike pay
alike—and vertical equity—those with the ability to pay more pay
more.70 This contention plays an important distinction in the realm
of cloud taxing. Namely, cloud taxing ultimately requires a means
to distinguish between not only the types of consumption within the
60. See id. at 118-19.
61. See BRUNORI, supra note 17, at 8-9.
62. See id.; Donna M. Byrne, Progressive Taxation Revisited, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 739, 742
(1995).
63. See BRUNORI, supra note 12, at 13.
64. See id.
65. See Corley, supra note 8.
66. See supra Part I.A.
67. See Too Reliant on the Few, ECONOMIST (Sept. 20, 2014), http://www.economist.com/
news/leaders/21618784-taxes-are-best-raised-broad-base-many-countries-it-worryingly-
narrow-too-reliant [https://perma.cc/8RXK-3CKY].
68. See CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE § 4-156-020(A) (2016).
69. See Subramanian, supra note 5.
70. BRUNORI, supra note 12, at 16-19.
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cloud, such as subscription fees, pay-per-event transactions, and the
hybrids like Amazon Prime, but also the volume of consumption by
individual taxpayers—the occasional viewer versus the binge
viewer.71
Ease of administration and compliance requires a balancing of
efficiency, revenue, and simplicity.72 Difficulties arise as to not only
what is taxable in the cloud,73 but also who should the government
tax, when they should be taxed, if a vendor satisfies the required
nexus, and to what extent a municipality can burden remote sellers
to collect and remit a tax.74 A more complicated scheme may lead to
greater costs of taxpayer compliance, shuttling time and money that
could be better spent on fiscal planning.75 Applied to a cloud tax,
additional risks arise as to means of tax avoidance—bypassing in-
creased tax fees to rely instead on free, ad-sponsored programming,
or worse, illegal streaming.76
71. See infra Part III. “A survey released ... by TiVo ... finds that 9 out of 10 people are
engaging in ‘binge viewing,’ which the digital video recording company defines as watching
more than three episodes of a particular TV show in one day.” Tom Huddleston, Jr., Survey:
Pretty Much Everybody is Binge-Watching TV, FORTUNE (June 30, 2015, 1:27 PM), http://
fortune.com/2015/06/30/binge-viewing-study/ [https://perma.cc/8HSV-Q5RY]. Binge viewing
is a contentious subject. See Ian Crouch, Come Binge with Me, NEW YORKER (Dec. 18, 2013),
http://www.newyorker.com/culture/culture-desk/come-binge-with-me [https://perma.cc/42HK-
XBAF] (“Somewhere in our response to the experience of watching multiple hours of television
there is, if not shame, the discomfiting feeling of being slightly out of control.... Part of the
problem is the phrase itself: binging on something is not traditionally considered an
admirable behavior.”). But, “[n]ot surprisingly, binge-watching is also less frowned upon ...
compared to two years ago.” Huddleston, supra. Even so, “31% of respondents to TiVo’s survey
said they have lost sleep to their binging habit while another 37% said they have spent an
entire weekend binging on a show.” Id.
72. See BRUNORI, supra note 12, at 19-21.
73. In the past, Netflix argued that its offerings were not subject to sales tax because it
was distinguishable as a “streaming service”: subscribers are paying not for ability to rent and
stream film, but for Netflix coding allowing viewable content across multiple platforms, the
ability to search its online access (much like Westlaw), a user interface incorporating
algorithms to predict preferences for each customer, and for the ability to stream, as opposed
to renting or even downloading a video. Diane Holman, Senior Sales Tax Manager, Netflix,
Inc., Statement by Netflix, Inc., at the Idaho State Tax Commission Commissioner’s Open
Meeting 1 (Nov. 19, 2014), https://tax.idaho.gov/pubs/rulesdoc_4jRyl4hQR9TnS.pdf [https://
perma.cc/F8RK-U4XD].
74. See infra Parts II, III.
75. See BRUNORI, supra note 12, at 20, 56.
76. Gary Shapiro, Commentary: No One’s Smiling About Chicago’s ‘Amusement Tax,’ CHI.
TRIB. (Aug. 24, 2015, 4:52 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/opinion/commentary/ct-
amusement-tax-streaming-netflix-hulu-perspec-0825-20150824-story.html [https://perma.cc/
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Accountability requires transparency from government in the
creation, enforcement, and benefits of any tax plan.77 Even so, it is
likely the importance of accountability will rise to much greater
prominence if and when digital tax comes to the forefront.78 Clarity,
however, may benefit all involved.
Despite these tax principles, local tax policy might be a lost cause.
Local tax policies and plans are flexible, changing at the hands of
local politics rather than begrudgingly slow state and federal
legislation.79 Coupling this with difficulties of implementing a sales
tax against remote vendors and costs of enforcement for smaller
localities leads to the argument that “[w]ithin the framework of
sound local tax policy, the property tax is the only viable source of
own-source tax revenue for local governments.”80 Unlike sales in a
changing economy, property remains a steady source, tracking land
and parcels is commonplace, evasion is difficult, and property has
a clear—literally physical—link to the source of the tax and the
community it serves to support.81 Localities like Chicago, however,
have a different incentive buttressing the desire to retain a sales
tax: a “local sales tax is particularly attractive for urban communi-
ties because it allows some of the tax burden to be exported to
nonresidents.”82 Yet, this shred of hope withers with the implemen-
tation strategy of a local cloud tax; the tax relies on a Chicago
address—residential or billing—for proof that the amusement took
place in Chicago.83 Compare this with the personal property lease
M6GH-BKAX].
77. See BRUNORI, supra note 12, at 21-22.
78. See Robert P. Strauss, Administrative and Revenue Implications of Alternative Federal
Consumption Taxes for the State and Local Sector, 14 AM. J. TAX POL’Y 361, 363 (1997)
(warning that governments must compromise between collecting tax revenue and protecting
public concerns of privacy, due process, and equal protection).
79. See BRUNORI, supra note 17, at 22.
80. Id.
81. See id. Property taxes provide local municipalities with the “largest source of own-
source revenue.” Scharff, supra note 54, at 303-04. Furthermore, not all municipalities have
the authority to impose sales tax, and even less have authority to impose additional income
taxes. See id. at 303; see also Edward A. Zelinsky, The Once and Future Property Tax: A
Dialogue with My Younger Self, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 2199, 2200-01 (2002) (“[T]he local
property tax survives for many reasons; chief among these is that the tax has distinct
theoretical and practical advantages.”).
82. BRUNORI, supra note 17, at 70.
83. See Widawsky, Amusement Tax Ruling, supra note 1, ¶ 13.
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transaction tax, which determines the location of a transaction by
the location of the terminal or device through which the consumer
gains access.84 Whether right or wrong, the cloud tax only applies to
Chicago residents, forfeiting one of the benefits of a local sales tax
in a major city.85
II. QUILL’S NEXUS AND THE ILLINOIS FRAMEWORK OF AMUSEMENT
TAX ANALYSIS
A. Quill and the Nexus Dilemma
In addressing a sales tax on remote vendors—albeit on mail-order
purchases rather than online e-commerce—the Supreme Court held
that a state sales and use tax cannot require an out-of-state vendor
to collect and remit taxes unless said vendor has a physical presence
in the state.86 Even though the Court held that a remote mail-order
vendor would be susceptible to a sales and use tax under the Due
Process Clause “minimum contacts” test, the same was not true
under the Commerce Clause’s required “substantial nexus.”87
Because of this, however, the Court opened up the ability for
Congress to make a change:
[T]he underlying issue is not only one that Congress may be
better qualified to resolve, but also one that Congress has the
ultimate power to resolve.... Accordingly, Congress is now free to
decide whether, when, and to what extent the States may
burden interstate mail-order concerns with a duty to collect use
taxes.88
Until such a change comes, Quill remains the standard for
analyzing nexus for remote, online vendors; however, both academia
and legislation challenge its interpretation.89 One interpretation is
84. See CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE § 3-32-020 (2016).
85. See Widawsky, Amusement Tax Ruling, supra note 1, ¶ 13.
86. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 317-18 (1992).
87. Id. at 312.
88. Id. at 318 (footnote omitted).
89. See, e.g., David Gamage & Devin J. Heckman, A Better Way Forward for State
Taxation of E-Commerce, 92 B.U. L. REV. 483, 484, 516-17 (2012). Another, more drastic
interpretation is that Quill only applies to sales and use taxes, and not other forms, see supra
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that Quill should prevent taxing remote vendors only when the tax
burdens interstate commerce.90 Under this approach, a tax is a
burden if  “an out-of-state vendor bears reporting or compliance
costs as a result of a state’s imposing tax collection duties on the
out-of-state vendor.”91 A proposed solution would see states compen-
sating vendors for these compliance costs as a means of eliminating
the burden under Quill.92 Potential benefits abound under such an
approach, including recouping losses from out-of-state e-commerce;
an even playing field between in-state and out-of-state vendors; and
simplified tax schemes due to the internalized costs imposed on the
taxing jurisdictions.93
Legislative attempts around Quill have been less inventive.94 One
of the first attempts was New York’s 2008 “Amazon tax.”95 Challeng-
ing the Quill physical presence requirement, the New York law
aimed to establish nexus of an out-of-state vendor through its use
of in-state, click-through advertisements.96 The law required those
online vendors to collect and remit taxes on purchases by New York
residents.97 Not only did the Court of Appeals of New York hold the
plaintiffs failed to prove the statute unconstitutional under the
Commerce Clause or the Due Process Clause, but the United States
Supreme Court denied writ of certiorari to this case and its
companion case.98
In Colorado, efforts to circumvent the Quill decision demanded
out-of-state vendors who failed to collect sales and use taxes to
notify purchasers that a tax was due to the state, as well as to
note 3, which may leave an opening for an amusement tax scheme.
90. See Gamage & Heckman, supra note 89, at 486-87.
91. Id.
92. See id. at 487.
93. See id. at 488. But some argue that allowing taxation on e-commerce could affect
online spending habits, estimating 75 percent of online buyers “would buy less on the Internet
if a sales tax were imposed.” Hal R. Varian, Taxation of Electronic Commerce, 13 HARV. J.L.
& TECH. 639, 639 (2000).
94. For example, Michigan and Wisconsin attempted to have taxpayers self-report out-of-
state purchases to collect use taxes, albeit unsuccessfully. See Varian, supra note 93, at 640.
95. See Gamage & Heckman, supra note 89, at 517.
96. See Overstock.com, Inc. v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Taxation and Fin., 987 N.E.2d 621, 622-
23 (N.Y. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 682 (2013); Morales, supra note 6, at 62-63.
97. See Morales, supra note 6, at 62.
98. Overstock.com, 987 N.E.2d at 622-23.
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provide the state with contact information for those purchasers.99
Even though the bill reached the Supreme Court on other grounds,
Justice Kennedy called for a change: “[G]iven these changes in
technology and consumer sophistication, it is unwise to delay any
longer a reconsideration of the Court’s holding in Quill. A case
questionable even when decided, Quill now harms states to a degree
far greater than could have been anticipated.”100
Possibly the most compelling challenge to Quill is an additional
de minimus threshold test.101 Rather than ridding states of Quill’s
physical presence test, states could implement an additional econ-
omic nexus standard.102 A remote vendor could satisfy substantial
nexus to a taxing jurisdiction if it either fulfilled Quill’s physical
presence or met a predetermined de minimis economic threshold.103
The de minimis threshold would operate via a dollar cap—for larger,
remote companies—at which point a remote vendor would be
required to collect and remit a tax to the taxing jurisdiction, or
through a percentage-of-sales framework—targeting smaller yet
still relevant remote vendors—where nexus is met if sales to a
taxing jurisdiction make up a significant percentage of that vendor’s
revenues.104 Granted, this would still require implementation
through Congress.105
B. Amusement Tax Analysis
An understanding of the Quill precedent is necessary for placing
the Chicago amusement tax in context because the Quill decision
also deals with nexus, and because most efforts to tax cloud
streaming will likely take a form other than a strict amusement
tax.106 The amusement tax framework, however, carries an addi-
tional wrinkle that may aid in understanding how a cloud tax on
99. See Morales, supra note 6, at 75-76.
100. Direct Mktg. Ass’n v. Brohl, 135 S. Ct. 1124, 1135 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
101. See John A. Swain, State Sales and Use Tax Jurisdiction: An Economic Nexus
Standard for the Twenty-First Century, 38 GA. L. REV. 343, 345 (2003).
102. See id. at 345, 366.
103. See id.
104. See id.
105. See id. at 346.
106. See infra Part III (discussing past and future proposals for taxing streaming enter-
tainment in the cloud).
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streaming entertainment may operate, especially as to the different
forms of online media entertainment and their differing and
respective pay schemes.107
1. Membership Fees Involving Amusement and Nonamusement
Components
Fittingly, the chronological evolution of the case law in Illinois
provides a series of decent benchmarks through which to analyze
the Chicago amusement tax rulings and a general cloud tax. In an
early challenge to an application of the amusement tax to health
and racquetball clubs, the Supreme Court of Illinois held in Chicago
Health Clubs, Inc. v. Picur that an amendment including a tax on
membership fees was unconstitutional.108 Chicago challenged that
because “at least some amusement activities occur at health and
racquetball clubs, a tax imposed on the receipts of such establish-
ments [was] proper.”109 Because the clubs at issue exhibited both
amusement and nonamusement components, and the ordinance did
not call for distinguishing between these components in its tax, the
court would not justify a tax on membership fees unless the fee
taxed predominately covered amusements.110
In its decision, the court relied on the plain language of the
ordinance, which did not distinguish between amusement and
nonamusement components.111 In the most recent tax ruling, how-
ever, Widawsky did just that.112 Even though the court did not reach
the question as to how it would rule had such language been present
in the ordinance, the language would do little to help in compliance.
This is a particular problem for membership fees like Amazon Prime
that, for a ninety-nine dollar fee, provides access to an array of
multiple benefits: free expedited shipping and delivery, unlimited
photo cloud storage, reserved deals and discounts, and—perhaps
107. For a brief discussion of issues relating to cloud usage and specifically the struggles
of distinguishing between leases and subscriptions as they apply to a potential tax, see Jordan
M. Goodman & Marilyn A. Wethekam, Emerging Tax Issues Connected to Cloud Usage, 12
DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 455, 462-63 (2014).
108. 528 N.E.2d 978, 984 (Ill. 1988).
109. Id. at 983 (emphasis added). 
110. See id. at 983-84.
111. See id. at 984.
112. See Widawsky, Amusement Tax Ruling, supra note 1, ¶ 12.
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most important at issue here—free, unlimited access to streaming
movies, television, and ad-free music.113 It would be nearly impossi-
ble for Amazon to determine if its fee is predominately amusement,
as such would deviate from person to person.
2. The Risk of the Occupational Tax
Under the Illinois Constitution—and in general—a tax should not
operate to punish a particular occupation.114 Illinois courts have
defined an occupational tax as a tax “that in practical effect imposes
a tax upon a given occupation or the provider of particular ser-
vices.”115 The challenge at issue in Communications & Cable of
Chicago, Inc. v. City of Chicago was whether an amendment to the
amusement tax to include paid television programming was an
occupational tax against cable providers because many of the same
or similar programs were available from video rental stores, online
services, or other nontaxable means.116 In its analysis, the Appellate
Court of Illinois relied on a three-prong test: (1) who collected and
remitted the tax; (2) who held the responsibility for payment if the
patron failed to pay; and (3) who was subject to penalty if the patron
failed to pay.117 Even so, the court reserved a caveat that an
occupational tax would survive if specifically authorized by the
General Assembly.118
The court held that the tax at issue taxed the activity of watching
television itself, not a specific occupation or provider.119 This is
important to the survival of the cloud tax for several reasons. In the
most basic sense, this is justification for a tax on paid cable services,
which is not far from the current state of many paid online video
services, especially at a time when online services such as Netflix,
Amazon, and Hulu are not only offering access to previously
released materials but also producing, distributing, and streaming
113. About Amazon Prime, AMAZON.COM, https://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/
display.html?nodeId=200444160 [https://perma.cc/VSH9-TCBG].
114. See Commc’ns & Cable of Chi., Inc. v. City of Chicago, 668 N.E.2d 1032, 1036 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1996).
115. E.g., id.
116. Id. at 1034-35.
117. Id. at 1036.
118. See id. at 1038.
119. See id. at 1039.
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their own programming.120 And, in a step away from the ruling in
Picur, the court refused to adopt a standard that would require an
analysis of a provider’s content to determine what was and was not
amusement.121
Another benefit of this ruling is one of the general fairness of a
cloud tax. The three-prong occupational tax test is not so much
important for its goal in defining an occupational tax, as it is a
benchmark for fairness of a cloud tax on entertainment. If a cloud
tax meets the test for an occupational tax, then it may be fundamen-
tally unfair to vendors, especially those out of state. If, in the plain
language of a cloud tax, an ordinance calls for online vendors to not
only collect and remit the tax, but also bear responsibility for a
consumer’s inability to pay and then be subject to penalty for that
consumer’s inability, then the ordinance should fail on its face.
3. Uniformity and the Cloud Tax
In Communications & Cable of Chicago, Inc., the Appellate Court
of Illinois also touched on another aspect crucial to a successful
cloud tax: uniformity.122 Classifications within the context of an
amusement tax or a cloud tax “must be based on real and substan-
tial differences between those taxed and those who are not and must
also bear some reasonable relationship to the object of the legisla-
tion or public policy.”123 When faced with the argument that a tax on
paid television programming was not uniform, the court shrugged
it off.124 The fact that the tax would apply differently to paid
programming as opposed to video rentals (at the time), free
broadcast television, or print media was so convincing as to make
the tax impermissible when similar distinctions were deemed
120. See, e.g., Orange Is the New Black (Lionsgate Television 2013-present) (Emmy Award-
winning “Netflix Original”); Transparent (Amazon Studios 2014-present). Transparent marked
the first online streaming series to win a Golden Globe. Jenelle Riley, Amazon, ‘Transparent’
Make History at Golden Globes, VARIETY (Jan. 11, 2015, 6:52 PM), http://variety.com/2015/tv/
news/amazon-transparent-make-history-at-golden-globes-1201400485/ [https://perma.cc/
E6HG-NBLX].
121. Commc’ns & Cable of Chi., 668 N.E.2d at 1039.
122. Id.
123. Id. 
124. See id.
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reasonable in the past.125 Here, on the contrary, the Chicago ruling
seeks to extend the tax on the traditional “privilege” of watching
television and movies to the online equivalent.126 But, the question
of uniformity is particularly pertinent to the proliferation of free, ad-
supported programming on the Internet—through services like
Pandora or Spotify, or even network and third party websites, such
as ABC, CW, or Hulu—as well as illegal streaming. The presence of
free alternatives should not hinder a tax on paid equivalents when
public policy supports the tax, as it does in the efforts of a cloud tax
to recoup the losses of programming that would otherwise be
taxable had it been consumed via traditional means like cable.127
4. The Internet Tax Freedom Act and Discrimination 
In City of Chicago v. StubHub!, Inc., StubHub! refused to collect
taxes on ticket sales under the amusement tax; however, it was
willing to furnish taxing information to individual jurisdictions to
collect for themselves.128 Understandably, rather than collecting
from thousands of individuals for dollars on the taxpayer, Chicago
preferred that StubHub!, and similar services, collect and remit the
taxes to minimize the number of parties involved in collection.129
The Seventh Circuit looked to the Internet Tax Freedom Act (ITFA)
for its answer.130 The ITFA, in an effort to encourage Internet access
to the public, prevented state and local governments from (1) impos-
ing a tax on Internet access, or (2) implementing either multiple or
discriminatory taxes on e-commerce.131
The court held that the Chicago amusement tax was not barred
under the multiple tax prohibition of the ITFA because the tax only
applied to tickets for events in Chicago, and therefore ensured no
125. Id. at 1040.
126. Widawsky, Amusement Tax Ruling, supra note 1, ¶ 8.
127. See Commc’ns & Cable of Chi., 668 N.E.2d at 1040.
128. 624 F.3d 363, 364 (7th Cir. 2010).
129. Id.
130. See id. at 365-67.
131. Nonna A. Noto, Extending the Internet Tax Moratorium and Related Issues, in
INTERNET TAXATION, supra note 58, at 17, 17-18. As the cloud streaming tax at issue here is
not so much a tax on access to the Internet as it is on entertainment, and even then on only
paid streaming entertainment, this Note continues on the assumption that the ITFA’s
prohibition on a tax to Internet access does not come into play.
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other municipality could collect the tax.132 In theory and on its face,
the cloud tax does just that: the amusement tax applies to only
those charges for the privilege to witness amusements “in the City,”
including, for online amusements, only those delivered electronically
in the City.133 Reality, however, is less certain. Even though the
ordinance calls—albeit questionably—for a means to determine
customers from Chicago, it does not provide a framework to
determine if and when consumption occurs in Chicago.134 This is not
a problem for traditional amusements under the tax; theaters,
concerts, and the like are not so different from the brick-and-mortar
retailer in that they physically exist in the taxing jurisdiction. But,
it is not impossible. Services like Netflix track account activity and
log-in location.135 Still, this may be an unfair burden to online
vendors—especially against smaller vendors who may not have such
tracking algorithms already in place.
Similarly, the court held that the amusement tax on ticket
resellers was not discriminatory under the ITFA because the tax
applied to both physical ticket resellers as well as online sellers like
StubHub!.136 Under the ITFA, a discriminatory tax “includes any ...
local tax on electronic commerce that is not levied in the same way,
at the same rate, or on the same person or entity.”137 Because of this
limitation by the ITFA, a blanket tax on streaming amusement, like
Chicago’s 9 percent cloud tax, is too broad.
On its face, the Chicago Amusement Tax Ruling faces several
hurdles under the discriminatory prohibition. Requiring online
132. StubHub!, Inc., 624 F.3d at 366.
133. Widawsky, Amusement Tax Ruling, supra note 1, ¶ 8.
134. See id. ¶ 13.
135. See, e.g., Recent Account Activity, NETFLIX, https://www.netflix.com [https://perma.cc/
294S-TNDE] (follow “Your Account” hyperlink; then follow “Viewing Activity” hyperlink; then
follow “See recent account access”).
136. StubHub!, Inc., 624 F.3d at 366-67. The court reserved the question of whether
municipalities may require intermediaries to collect and remit amusement taxes to the state
high court. Id. at 368. The Supreme Court of Illinois later held that Chicago could not force
Internet auction listing services to collect the tax; however, it explicitly distinguished Internet
auctioneers, who cannot be made to collect and remit the tax, from sellers and resellers of
tickets, who “may be made to collect the tax.” City of Chicago v. StubHub, Inc., 979 N.E.2d
844, 856-67 (Ill. 2011).
137. Noto, supra note 131, at 30. But see supra notes 114-18 and accompanying text
(detailing possibly incongruent approaches within the Chicago state courts, prohibiting taxes
not predominately for amusement, but allowing taxes for amusements where similar outlets
are free or nontaxable).
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vendors to determine not only consumers in Chicago, but also when
their consumption takes place within the confines of Chicago places
extreme burdens on the vendors, potentially risking unequal tax
treatment.138 Returning to principles of neutrality, an ideal tax
“would not discriminate between types of consumption, would not
distort choices of techniques of production and distribution, would
treat local and remote vendors the same, and would not distort the
location of economic activity.”139
In the case of digitized content, there is some risk of manipulation
and consequently uneven tax treatment because a vendor may not
know or have means to know where a buyer is located.140 Using a
billing address as a proxy—as called for in Chicago’s ruling, and
possibly the most logical start—might not be enough.141 Potential for
inconsistency abounds when one provider may rely on a residential
address and another on a billing statement.142 A prime example
could be the out-of-state or out-of-city college student or recent mov-
ers to the city. If these taxpayers retain a billing address—such as
for a parent’s credit card—outside of the taxing jurisdiction, and a
vendor utilizes a consumer’s billing address to source its tax obliga-
tions, the city would not only miss out on a viable tax source based
on the generational affinity for streaming media, but it could also
138. See supra notes 126-28 and accompanying text.
139. McLure, supra note 27, at 118-19.
140. See id. at 121-22.
141. See id.
142. While a noble effort as a proxy for sourcing Chicago residents, the “as reflected by”
language may jeopardize fair implementation of the tax, or a cloud tax in general. See
Widawsky, Amusement Tax Ruling, supra note 1, ¶ 13; see also McLure, supra note 52, at 319
(“While the billing address of credit cards may be instructive in determining the destination
of sales, it need not be, as it can be manipulated easily. Moreover, in some developing
technologies for making payments, vendors do not receive credit card information, in order
to reduce the risk of theft of credit card numbers.”).
Yet another wrinkle is the ease of sharing passwords, a practice not necessarily combated
by the streaming giants:
Internet video-subscription services will lose as much as $500 million in 2015
due to illicit password sharing.... [T]he practice appears to be quite
commonplace: In a recent Consumer Reports survey, 46% of American adults
said they shared log-ins for streaming media services with people who were not
part of the same household.
Brad Tuttle, The Real Rules for Sharing Passwords at HBO Now, Netflix, Amazon Prime, and
Hulu, TIME (Sept. 21, 2015), http://time.com/money/4043147/hbo-netflix-amazon-prime-share-
account-password/ [https://perma.cc/3ZNP-MT8F]. But, executives do not necessarily want to
penalize the practice as it may encourage paying customers in the future. See id.
1054 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:1029
risk discriminating against dutiful taxpayers within the city.
Furthermore, this is under the assumption that these are innocently
missed opportunities, and not intentional manipulations to avoid a
tax.
The disparity between different online media forms and their
respective fees makes the risk of discrimination all the more
apparent. Even though the design of the ordinance seeks to tax the
privilege to experience an amusement, not all privileges are equal.
The privileges, or rather their fees, exist in three basic categories:
the per-transaction fee, the subscription fee, and the hybrid,
consisting of subscription and transaction elements and even
nonamusement components.143
First, the per-transaction fee, most easily understood through the
example of an iTunes rental, provides the consumer temporary
access, often through the form of a temporary download over a
twenty-four or forty-eight hour period.144 Second, subscription fees,
such as those paid to Netflix or Hulu, are recurring fees offering
unlimited access to select items in their libraries.145 Finally is the
hybrid model, like Amazon Prime. It is neither a subscription fee for
the sole purpose of access to amusement, nor is it a per-transaction
cost (though it provides that option on non-Prime titles).146
Under the different fees, watching the same film could result in
drastically different results. Because we are in the legal realm, take,
for example, To Kill a Mockingbird,147 currently available on Net-
143. For sake of clarity, note that the Chicago amusement tax applies only to rentals, not
sales. Widawsky, Amusement Tax Ruling, supra note 1, ¶ 10. Additionally, the tax only
applies to paid privileges, and does not take into account privilege to access ad-supported
programming. See id. ¶ 8.
144. See, e.g., About Renting Movies from the iTunes Store, APPLE.COM, https://support.
apple.com/en-us/HT201611 [https://perma.cc/23FE-AYWS].
145. See, e.g., How Does Netflix Work?, NETFLIX, https://help.netflix.com/en/node/412
[https://perma.cc/5DQ5-KB7H]. This may occur through streaming or download depending on
the provider. As discussed earlier, Netflix has in the past challenged the assumption that it
is subject to sales and use tax under the theory that it is a service and that streaming and
downloads deserve separate treatment. See supra note 73.
146. Amazon Prime Terms, AMAZON.COM, http://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/
display.html/ref=amblink3737305823?ie=UTF8&nodeId=13819201&pfrdm=ATVPDKIKX0
DER&pfrds=cent [https://perma.cc/GX52-R7E5]. This hybrid may also include on-demand
rental services through cable providers like Comcast or Cox if the specific rental transactions
are not already covered by a tax on the cable service itself.
147. TO KILL A MOCKINGBIRD (Universal Studios 1962).
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flix.148 Rounding for ease of explanation, an iTunes rental of HD
quality costs approximately four dollars,149 with a 9 percent tax
costing thirty-six cents.150 This rental can be viewed on one device
over a period of twenty-four hours.151 The current Netflix subscrip-
tion costs ten dollars per month, with a 9 percent tax costing ninety
cents.152 Not only does this provide HD quality access, but access to
two screens at a time.153 Assuming the same title is available on
Amazon Prime for unlimited streaming at ninety-nine dollars per
year, the tax would come to $8.91. Taking the example to the
extreme, suppose an aspiring law student desires to play the film
twenty-four hours each day for the entire year before applying to
law school. The Amazon Prime tax remains $8.91; the Netflix tax
comes to $10.80 (without taking into account this law student could
watch it on two screens simultaneously for that entire year); and the
tax on iTunes would come in at $131.40, or $131.76 on a leap year
(at 9 percent for a four dollar rental each day). A new release would
be even more extreme under the iTunes per-transaction framework.
Granted, the above example borders on the absurd, but it has
some merit.154 It might not be all that uncommon for a consumer
without subscription access to rent two films over the course of a
weekend. At that point, that consumer, assuming the same prices
above, will have spent eight dollars, accumulated a tax obligation of
seventy-two cents, and had access to two films for twenty-four hours
each. This consumer is in the same financial position as the monthly
Netflix subscriber who has access to thousands of titles, on multiple
148. Available, at least, at the time of this writing.
149. iTunes Store, APPLE, https://itunes.apple.com/us/movie/to-kill-a-mockingbird/id2830
68031 [https://perma.cc/DFS7-A7JT] (search in search bar for “To Kill a Mockingbird,” then
follow “Rent HD” hyperlink).
150. Additionally, for sake of simplicity, the following calculations assume that the tax is
being added on top of the listed price, and not totaled into that listed price.
151. See Apple’s iTunes Terms and Conditions, supra note 31.
152. See How Does Netflix Work?, supra note 145.
153. Frequently Asked Questions About Netflix Billing, NETFLIX, https://help.netflix.com/en/
node/41049 [https://perma.cc/NB6X-6Q6E] (indicating that Netflix costs $9.99 per month for
two-screen access).
154. In 2015, for persons age fifteen and over, watching television occupied more time than
any other leisure activity at approximately 2.8 hours per day, according to the Bureau of
Labor Statistics. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, USDL-16-1250,
AMERICAN TIME USE SURVEY—2015 RESULTS 2 (2016), http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/
atus.pdf [https://perma.cc/P8B9-ZBRQ].
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screens, for a month (or, 720 hours in a thirty-day month). On the
contrary, another consumer may pay the yearly Amazon Prime fee
and never stream a video, taking advantage, instead, of its shipping
benefits. 
This disparity seems ripe for discriminatory review and questions
the purpose of a cloud tax. If the purpose is to recoup losses as
quickly as possible from the cord-cutting generation without regard
to fairness, then maybe the tax succeeds. If, however, the goal—
punitive or not—is to tax streaming activity, then maybe the tax
fails. Although the tax may not reward binge watching, it certainly
incentivizes it. Rather than taxing those most likely to stream to
excess, it taxes the sensible, occasional viewer. These incongruities
highlight the necessity for a new proposal and framework for taxing
entertainment within the cloud.
III. A NEW PROPOSAL AND A RESPONSE TO OTHERS PAST, PRESENT,
AND FUTURE
A. A Privilege-Based Framework
Rather than rely on a blanket tax on any fee charged for the
privilege to stream online media, a successful tax should distinguish
between the three types of paid, privileged access: per-transaction
privilege; subscription privilege; and the hybrid privilege.
1. Per-Transaction Privilege 
Transaction-based amusement is straightforward: tax per trans-
action. Transaction-based amusement should, like the Chicago
amusement tax, call for a tax on the charge paid for that particular
transaction. But transaction-based amusement should be levied at
a lower tax rate than subscription services. The purpose of the lower
rate is to maintain the balance between the unlimited access of
subscription services and the temporary access for per-transaction
privileges. iTunes is the most common relevant example.155
155. See, e.g., About Renting Movies from the iTunes Store, supra note 144.
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2. Subscription Privilege
On the whole, the tax plan should attempt to balance the tax
imposed based on the amount of consumption, measured in terms
of hours or data transfer, rather than charge paid. Subscription
plans should implement an algorithm to account for individual
viewing and listening habits. Although this is a greater administra-
tive burden, it is not necessarily so extreme. Many vendors already
have such systems in place, even down to the minutes viewed in
some cases.156 If a vendor does not already have such an algorithm,
the burden should be on the taxing jurisdiction to either provide
such an algorithm or subsidize the costs of implementing one
through a third party. Apply this history and tracking to the
monthly subscription fee to calculate the accrued tax.
A fitting parallel is broadband pricing. Even though flat-rate
broadband pricing is simple and predictable, forcing each consumer
to pay the same price for unlimited broadband access, it forces light
Internet users to subsidize the heavy Internet users.157 “Usage-
based pricing,” or “metering,” bills Internet users based on the
amount of data used.158 In particular, a “two-part tariff,” in which a
consumer pays a fixed monthly rate coupled with an additional fee
beyond a set limit, allows all consumers to contribute some amount
to common cost in providing broadband service, while still shifting
some additional cost onto the heaviest users.159 In other words, the
low-level users still carry some of the cost of the heaviest users,
without abusing the heaviest users who bear an additional cost.160
Much like the blanket cloud tax, “[u]nder a flat-rate pricing system,
lighter users end up paying a disproportionate share of overall
network costs.”161 Forcing lower use consumers to subsidize heavy
users could discourage poorer consumers from purchasing broad-
band services, even going so far as limiting their access to them.162
156. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
157. Lyons, supra note 25, at 3-5.
158. Id. at 6-7.
159. Id. at 7.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 13.
162. Id. (“These consumers demand less from the Internet each month than the average
user, and therefore may not place a high premium on unlimited access, though they might be
willing to pay a lower rate for the small amount of monthly data to meet their needs.”).
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The same two-tier approach should be implemented in the context
of a cloud tax on subscription fees. There is a caveat within this
proposal, however. As the purpose of this proposal is to increase
revenue while balancing a tax to the individual usage without
punishing viewing habits, this proposal includes an upper cap on
the amount taxed for any subscription-based service. Determining
this upper cap would fall on the finance department of the taxing
jurisdiction, based both on a calculation of averages of monthly fees
across different services and on daily average viewing habits within
that jurisdiction. Additionally, if a particular provider should
disagree with this calculation, believing its subscribers’ habits are
substantially different from the averages used, then that provider
should have the right to request a particular price cap. The burden
of any calculation should fall on the state or local jurisdiction impos-
ing the tax, not the provider.
3. Hybrid Privilege
The hybrid fees are potentially the most challenging. Hybrid
services like Amazon Prime raise issues of bundled charges includ-
ing taxable and nontaxable components.163 Ideally, such providers
could provide a breakdown of their own costs and how much of the
membership fees apply to amusement; however, fairness would
require the provider to present such a breakdown for each consumer
because of differing consumption habits. To be subject to the tax,
this would also require the provider to determine that each
consumer is using its services predominately for amusement.164 A
potential solution would be an opt-in provision. If a consumer
partakes in a hybrid service, he agrees to be subject to the tax in
order to gain access to the amusement privileges, from which point
the tax is calculated pro rata based on consumption history and
subject to an upper cap like the standard subscription services.
163. See supra Part II.B.1.
164. See supra Part II.B.
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4. Nexus
As to remote vendors, Professor John Swain’s framework would
be ideal in establishing nexus—forcing a remote vendor to collect or
remit a tax only if the vendor meets a satisfactory physical presence,
or a de minimis economic presence within the taxing jurisdiction.165
But this would require input from Congress.166 Additionally, a
problem remains in determining if and when an amusement takes
place within a taxing jurisdiction. The billing address proxy, as
discussed above, while lacking, may be the least invasive and least
burdensome approach.167 A more accurate approach would call for
an algorithm, like that in the subscription fee proposal, which
tracks location, again, with the burden being on the city to provide
such an algorithm, and then only to those vendors with substantial
nexus.168 Finally, in an effort to ease the burdens on out-of-state
vendors forced to collect a tax for multiple local jurisdictions within
a single state, vendors could employ a “blended rate that reflects the
average of all local rates in a given state.”169 Better still, taxing
jurisdictions could create a uniform system to ease remote-vendor
treatment across state and local lines.170
B. Other Proposals, Analogues, and Nontax Alternatives
Even though Chicago’s approach distinguishes itself from others
as an amusement tax, with a specific emphasis on streaming
entertainment within the cloud, other proposals have attempted to
recoup losses from the changing media market and the trend toward
e-commerce in general.171
165. See supra notes 101-04 and accompanying text.
166. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
167. See supra Part II.B.4.
168. See supra Part III.A.2.
169. McLure, supra note 27, at 122. This approach, however, might be subject to judicial
scrutiny without input from Congress; although a blended rate would impose less burden on
a vendor, it may be unfair to those jurisdictions with a rate higher than the blended rate
subject to potential losses. See id.
170. See infra Part III.B.
171.  And, Chicago is not alone in attacks on the colloquial moniker—Chicago has the
“Cloud Tax,” whereas Canada and Australia have the “Netflix Tax.” See, e.g., Joe Harpaz,
More Countries Jump on ‘Netflix Tax’ Bandwagon, FORBES (Sept. 3, 2015, 3:51 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/joeharpaz/2015/09/03/more-countries-jump-on-netflix-tax-
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The European Union, for example, planned a value-added tax
against providers of broadcasters based on the locations of custom-
ers, rather than providers.172 Even though it had the same goals of
securing tax revenue from consumption within its jurisdiction,
administrative problems caused trouble.173 In particular, applying
the value-added tax across the European Union creates fairness
concerns because it forces providers to collect and remit to jurisdic-
tions under different tax regimes.174 Despite these problems, the
European Union expects the value-added tax could create an
additional $1 billion in annual revenue.175 
The European Union approach introduces another problem. Many
of the larger companies do not plan on raising prices, causing them
to suffer a 30 percent cut from each sale.176 Granted, this is better
for consumers. However, because this removes some of the benefits
of jurisdiction shopping for better tax rates for corporations, it may
encourage once low-tax jurisdictions to raise taxes, as proposed in
Luxembourg.177 The proposal here, while not completely eliminating
the problem, may offer some headway. Rather than implementing
a per-transaction privilege, tailoring the tax to reflect user consump-
tion, as well as placing caps for excessive viewers, allows corpora-
tions to take less of a cut from profits to account for the different
privilege types.
Countries outside of the European Union are also contemplating
means to collect from foreign online providers. New Zealand,
claiming overlooked revenue of $180 million per year—$40 million
bandwagon/ [https://perma.cc/2MKA-C7PZ]; Mathew Katz, Canada’s Big Election Issue: The
Netflix Tax, TIME (Aug. 6, 2015), http://time.com/3987607/canada-netflix-tax/ [https://perma.cc/
TEL4-W8HR].
172. See Harpaz, supra note 171 (discussing problems of implementing a universal value-
added tax based on customer locations when one regime taxes 15 percent and another taxes
25 percent). For perspective, see Value-Added Tax, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014),
for a definition of value-added tax: “A tax assessed at each step in the production of a commod-
ity ... which is levied in several European countries—effectively acts as a sales tax on the
ultimate consumer.”
173. See Harpaz, supra note 171.
174. See id. (comparing a Luxembourg 15 percent value-added tax to Sweden’s higher 25
percent value-added tax).
175. Mark Scott, Digital Tax Increase to Take Effect in Europe, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 1, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/02/business/international/digital-tax-increase-to-take-effect-
in-europe.html [https://perma.cc/8EXC-4NZW].
176. See id.
177. See id.
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from the likes of iTunes, Netflix, and Spotify—proposed lowering
the tax-free duty threshold on a goods and services tax so as to
collect from offshore vendors. Such an approach, however, is likely
limited to collecting from only the largest companies.178 Similarly,
Japan issued an 8 percent consumption tax on remote vendors
providing electronic services to consumers in Japan.179
Jurisdictions within the United States have also made several
attempts to tax online services. For example, Idaho attempted to
cull streaming services from usually nontaxable services and place
them under the sales tax; other states—Arizona, Indiana, New
York, Texas, and Washington—made similar attempts to apply
cloud streaming to sales taxes as well.180 Idaho organized its tax as
an extension of sales and use, including cloud software.181 Not only
did this create backlash from companies, but it also created
arguments that such a tax places what are arguably licenses or
services under the umbrella of a sales and use tax.182 Most recently,
Pennsylvania implemented a 6 percent sales and use tax on
electronically transferred digital products.183 Pennsylvania’s tax on
digital products is considerably striking not only for its structure as
a sales and use tax, but also its application to all electronically
transferred digital products, be it a subscription service, rental, or
purchase.184 These examples highlight an important benefit of the
Chicago amusement tax, or any plan specialized for taxing paid,
online media. Singling out amusement may avoid attacks under
theories that a license or service should not fall under a sales and
use tax scheme, and concerns that a double tax may result merely
because of the avenue of delivery.
178. See Isaac Davison, NZ’s ‘Netflix Tax’ Set to Rise as GST Changed on Digital
Downloads, N.Z. HERALD (Aug. 18, 2015, 11:38 AM), http://www.nzherald.co.nz/business/
news/article.cfm?c_id=3&objectid=11499034 [https://perma.cc/3VMH-SVLN].
179. See Harpaz, supra note 171.
180. Steven D. Jones, Idaho Wants to Tax the Cloud, WALL STREET J. (Feb. 6, 2013, 9:14
PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323452204578287793482679304 [https://
perma.cc/79YR-LQY4].
181. See id.; Betsy Z. Russell, Idaho Relaxes Software Taxes, SPOKESMAN-REV. (June 1,
2014), http://www.spokesman.com/stories/2014/jun/01/idaho-relaxes-software-taxes/ [https://
perma.cc/7D6G-MNZM].
182. See Jones, supra note 180; Russell, supra note 181.
183. See supra note 1.
184. See Digital Products, supra note 1.
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Another obvious, though less lucrative, proposal is the nontax
proposal: exempt cloud services from sales taxes. Several states
reached this conclusion.185 The nontax proposal has some traction in
academia, as well as in the government.186 Another nontax approach
would call for implementing a charge akin to a user fee, license fee,
or service charge, rather than a sales tax.187 This approach would
equate a fee for Internet access to streaming media to fees charged
for tuition, public health care, access to parks, recreation, and
highways, or permissions for professional licensing of an attorney
or doctor.188 On first glance, the idea of a user fee approach may
seem strange; however, for local jurisdictions, user fees and charges
are the second-most significant resource of nontax revenue behind
intergovernmental aid, and nearly every local government imposes
a fee on parks and recreation, sanitation, and the like.189 But each
of the nontax proposals fail. Obviously, the goal of recouping total
losses to cord-cutters is impossible. Furthermore, a user fee, al-
though fair in the sense that anyone wishing to use a service is
taxed, does not account for consumption habits and would either
result in low consumption taxpayers subsidizing high consumption
taxpayers or in a lower revenue overall.190
185. Kansas, Nebraska, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Virginia, and Wisconsin have considered
the nontax approach in the past. See Jones, supra note 180.
186. See Varian, supra note 93, at 644-49 (suggesting various nontax proposals: no out-of-
state tax, no e-commerce tax, or elimination of a sales tax entirely coupled with an overall
increase in income tax); supra note 4; see also supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text (con-
tending property tax is the only viable local tax). Some view that equal rights to information
and technology should outweigh any cause to tax the Internet. See, e.g., Joshua L. Friedman
& Gary C. Norman, The Norman/Friedman Principle: Equal Rights to Information and
Technology Access, 18 TEX. J. ON C.L. & C.R. 47, 48-50 (2012) (arguing that freedom of
information, especially when using disabled persons as a focal point, should limit any
restriction on Internet access, even sources of amusement); see also Digital Goods and
Services Tax Fairness Act of 2015, S. 851, 114th Cong. (2015).
187. See BRUNORI, supra note 12, at 113; Scharff, supra note 54, at 303-05.
188. See BRUNORI, supra note 12, at 113.
189. See BRUNORI, supra note 17, at 103; Scharff, supra note 54, at 304 (“[M]unicipalities
have also shifted to user fees to supplement general tax revenue in the wake of property tax
assessment limits and other restrictions on the local property tax base. One driving force in
the shift to user fees is that local governments have a much greater authority to impose such
charges without explicit state authorization.” (footnotes omitted)). Granted, difficulties arise
in justifying the position, as implementing the fee would likely require some link to a public
service or benefit to the jurisdiction. Additionally, it is unclear how such a regime would
succeed within a state.
190. See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
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Moving closer to the realm of a sales and use tax is the option of
an excise tax: a special tax on levies such as alcohol, fuel, tobacco,
hotels, and telecommunications.191 Fittingly, these taxes generally
operate on a tally per unit rather than a cost of the product, such as
a tax of cents on the gallon.192 The goal of such excise taxes is not so
different from the goal of taxing streaming services based on the
amount of consumption.193 An excise tax, however, presents two
specific problems. First, it generally carries a social concern, more
so than collection of revenue; often, these taxes punish undesirable
activities, like smoking, or costs imposed on states because of that
product’s consumption.194 An argument that an excise tax on
streaming media is socially valid exists—excessive binge viewing
and sitting can increase health risks like diabetes, risks that may
later be borne by the taxing jurisdiction in public health care and
benefits.195 Even so, this may be a stretch. Second, excise taxes are
generally collected at the distributor level, rather than at the con-
sumer level, which may lead to administrative duties in collection.196
The trend of collecting the excise tax from the distributor leads to
another, albeit out-of-the-box, tax regime that would seek to tax the
business inputs rather than the consumer.197 A trend that incorpo-
rates an excise tax might lead to easier administration, bypassing
the need to collect on behalf of consumers and calculating the
consumption of each consumer. But taxing the business inputs will
eventually be reflected in a consumer’s purchase price, violating the
tax principle of accountability and transparency.198 It may lead not
only to potential tax pyramiding, but, more pressing, may eliminate
transparency as the cost of the tax will be hidden from the customer,
as is the case in a traditional sales tax.199
191. See BRUNORI, supra note 12, at 100.
192. Id.
193. See supra Part III.A.
194. BRUNORI, supra note 12, at 101-02.
195. See Alice Park, This Is What Binge Watching TV Does to Your Health, TIME (Apr. 1,
2015), http://time.com/3767458/tv-binge-watching-health/ [https://perma.cc/5E2E-VJ4A].
196. See BRUNORI, supra note 12, at 100-01.
197. Id. at 65.
198. Id.
199. Id.; see also supra Part II. For a discussion of how tax pyramiding results in
consumers accounting for taxes on both their individual purchase and the retailer’s tax on
buying stock, see 85 C.J.S. Taxation § 2162 (2016) (“A ‘pyramiding of tax’ occurs when a
product is taxed at a pre-retail stage, and thus, a tax is imposed on successive buyers and
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Finally, an adoption of a uniform tax system likely would be the
most effective approach. Such a system would create an interstate
uniform sales tax regime, adopting uniform definitions of products,
taxable and nontaxable events, uniform business treatment, and
uniform state and local frameworks.200 Each taxing jurisdiction
would retain the right to create its own tax rates; a vendor would
need to implement only a single tax regime against all of its
consumers, and would be responsible for changing only the rate for
each jurisdiction.201 Such an initiative is already in place. The
Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement is a unified effort of
forty-four states, the District of Columbia, local governments, and
businesses to create a simplified sales and use tax regime for remote
vendors.202 Currently, twenty-four of the forty-four states have
implemented the streamlined regime, representing 33 percent of the
total U.S. population.203 Coupling such a regime with a cloud-specific
policy as proposed in this Note would be the ideal method of
encouraging uniformity, transparency, ease of implementation, and
a means to reflect trends toward an online media market.
sellers rather than only at the final sale of the product.”).
200. See McLure, supra note 27, at 119.
201. See id.
202. What Is the Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement?, STREAMLINED SALES TAX
GOVERNING BD., INC., http://www.streamlinedsalestax.org/index.php?page=gen_1 [https://
perma.cc/XMK5-V5L7].
203. How Many States Have Passed Legislation Conforming to the Agreement?,
STREAMLINED SALES TAX GOVERNING BD., INC., http://www.streamlinedsalestax.org/index.php?
page=gen_3 [https://perma.cc/2RSE-XKRM].
2017] TAXING THE CLOUD 1065
CONCLUSION
This Note addresses a problem that many taxing jurisdictions are
avoiding under the guise of difficult administration or the notion
that a tax to cloud entertainment would threaten or hinder advan-
ces in digital technology. But society has passed that point. It is
unlikely that efforts to tax remote, online vendors would drive
consumers and the economy away from the instant and unlimited
access the Internet provides.204 And with the shift to an access-based
market, the time has come for a change to the Quill precedent. This
Note does not call to eliminate the necessity of a nexus standard;
rather, it suggests that a physical presence standard is inadequate
in the face of ever-evolving online e-commerce. Congress, using its
powers under the Commerce Clause should seek a means to create
an economic de minimis nexus to supplement the already-present
physical standard.
Although a congressional solution to the issue of nexus is likely
the first step in a successful fair and nationwide tax on the cloud,
cloud taxes must also recognize the differences of fees and services
within the cloud. A blanket tax will fail as long as the cloud contains
per-transaction fees, subscriptions, and hybrids, especially when it
comes to online entertainment. A successful tax plan must account
for these differences. The plan should strive to account for consump-
tion habit, without changing a consumer’s decisions to engage in
that online consumption. Per-transaction fees must be taxed at a
rate low enough that these consumers are not unfairly subsidizing
the heavy use of subscribers with unlimited access. Similarly,
subscription taxes must reflect viewing and consumption habits,
placing the heaviest tax burdens on those consuming the most,
while still retaining a cap so as to not abuse their habits and draw
204. From just 2013 to 2014, e-commerce revenues in the United States for services in-
creased 11.8 percent and retail sales increased 14.3 percent, with each category totaling in
2014 at $510 billion and $298.6 billion, respectively. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, E14-ESTATS, E-
STATS 2014: MEASURING THE ELECTRONIC ECONOMY 1-2 (June 7, 2016), http://www.census.gov/
content/dam/Census/library/publications/2016/econ/e14-estats.pdf [https://perma.cc/5L5C-
ZS6Y]. Compare this to data from 2004 when e-commerce services accounted for $59 billion
and retail sales accounted for $71 billion. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, E-STATS 1-2 (May 25, 2006),
http://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2006/econ/2004reportfinal.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9M4Y-2L76]. But see supra note 93.
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them away from engaging in such subscription services. Finally, the
hybrids should be taxed on a pro rata basis of consumption rather
than on a total membership fee, especially when nonamusement
components may dominate that fee. Under the assumption that the
nexus is met, the burden should be on vendors to collect and remit
the tax based on their determination of who is consuming and how
much is being consumed within a particular jurisdiction. The
burden, however, should fall on the revenue-seeking jurisdictions to
supply these vendors with a means to calculate consumption habits
and location and subsidize those vendors for their efforts to collect
and remit the tax.
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